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INTRODUCTION

Building upon a body of scholarship1 that compares constitutional
*

Professor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center. Earlier
versions of this Article were presented at the Beznos Family Lectures at Michigan State
University College of Law, where I served as the Beznos Distinguished Professor, and at the
Jewish Community Center of Metropolitan Detroit. I thank Harold Beznos for sponsoring the
lectures, I thank Joan Howarth and Michigan State University for their hospitality, and I thank
Michigan Supreme Court Justice Stephen Markman for his thoughtful public response to my
remarks. A draft of this Article was also presented at a faculty colloquium at Touro Law
Center, and I thank my colleagues at Touro for their helpful comments.
1
See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (rev. ed. 2011); JAROSLAV
PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2004); Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry
and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA L. REV. 553 (2003); Robert M.
Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); David R. Dow, Constitutional
Midrash: The Rabbis’ Solution to Professor Bickel’s Problem, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 543 (1992);
Ronald R. Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 35 (1985); Ronald R. Garet, Gnostic Due Process, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
97 (1995); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984);
Bernhard Grossfeld, Religion and Law: Comparative Legal Semiotics, 18 L. & BUS. REV.
AM. 3, 26 (2012); Gregory A. Kalscheur S.J., Christian Scripture and American Scripture:
An Instructive Analogy?, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 101 (2006); Sanford Levinson, “The
Constitution” in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123 (1979); Francis J. Mootz
III, Belief and Interpretation: Meditations on Pelikan’s “Interpreting the Bible and the
Constitution”, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 385 (2006); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation”, 58 S. CAL L. REV. 551
(1985); Shlomo C. Pill, Valuing Our Discordant Constitutional Discourse: Autonomous-Text
Constitutionalism and the Jewish Legal Tradition, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 349 (2016); Chaim
Saiman, Jesus’ Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 97 (2007); Maimon
Schwarzschild, Pluralist Interpretation: From Religion to the First Amendment, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447 (1996); David A. Skeel, Jr., What Were Jesus and the Pharisees
Talking About when They Talked About Law?, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 141 (2007); Peter J. Smith
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interpretation to biblical and literary interpretation,2 and relying on an insight
from a prominent nineteenth century rabbinic scholar, this Article briefly
explores similarities in the interpretation of the Torah—the text of the Five
Books of Moses—and the United States Constitution. Specifically, this
& Robert W. Tuttle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional Originalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 693 (2011); Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041 (1999);
Symposium, Scriptural Interpretation and Constitutional Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 273 (2009); Symposium, Text, Tradition, and Reason in Comparative Perspective, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2006); Steven D. Smith, Review Essay, What Doth It Profit? Pelikan’s
Parallels, 90 MINN. L. REV. 727 (2006) (reviewing JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE
BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2004)); Emil A. Kleinhaus, Note, History as Precedent: The
Post-Originalist Problem in Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 121 (2000); Jeanne C.
Fromer, Note, Looking to Statutory Intertext: Toward the Use of the Rabbinic Biblical
Interpretive Stance in American Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1456, 1479
(2002); Michael Sink, Comment, Restoring Our Ancient Constitutional Faith, 75 U. COLO. L.
REV. 921 (2004); Harold Anthony Lloyd, Gorsuch and Originalism: Some Critiques from
Logic,
Scripture,
and
Art
(Mar.
5,
2017)
(unpublished
essay),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927810. See generally SAMUEL J. LEVINE, JEWISH LAW AND
AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2018); see also Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction
to Legislation in Jewish Law, with References to the American Legal System, 29 SETON HALL
L. REV. 916 (1999) [hereinafter Levine, Legislation in Jewish Law]; Samuel J. Levine,
Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative, 1998 UTAH L. REV.
465 (1998) [hereinafter Levine, Halacha and Aggada]; Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal
Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1997) [hereinafter Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American
Constitutional Theory]; Samuel J. Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory:
The Constitutional Rule in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 69 MD. L. REV. 78 (2009)
[hereinafter Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory]; Samuel J. Levine, Of
Inkblots and Omnisignificance: Conceptualizing Secondary and Symbolic Functions of the
Ninth Amendment, in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 277
(2009) [hereinafter Levine, Of Inkblots and Omnisignificance]; Samuel J. Levine, Taking
Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in
a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003); Samuel J. Levine,
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary
Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511 (1998) [hereinafter Levine,
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations]. Cf. Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A Talmudic
maxim instructs with respect to the Scripture: ‘Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein.’
Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, but the Due Process
Clause most assuredly does not.”) (citing 8 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: SEDER NEZIKIN,
TRACTATE ABOTH, Ch. V, Mishnah 22, 75–77 (I. Epstein trans., 1935)).
2
In addition to many of the works cited supra note 1, some of the groundbreaking
scholarship in this field includes, for example, INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A
HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); JAMES
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985);
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984); Stanley Fish, Fish v.
Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 739 (1982); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982);
Richard H. Weisberg, Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L.
REV. 939 (1986).
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Article draws upon Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin’s (“Netziv”)
intriguing suggestion that the interpretation of the text of the Torah parallels
the interpretation of poetry.3 According to Netziv, this parallel accounts for
the practice of interpreting the Torah expansively in ways that derive
substantive legal rules and principles far beyond those found in the relatively
narrow wording of the text.4 Moreover, Netziv explains that deriving these
interpretations, which, at times, seem far removed from the literal reading of
the text, requires a level of technical expertise similar to the skilled literary
analysis necessary for thorough, thoughtful, and meaningful interpretation
of poetry.5
Based on Netziv’s insight, this Article focuses on two methods of
interpreting the Torah6 and the Constitution7 that may otherwise appear to
3

See NAFTALI ZVI YEHUDAH BERLIN, KIDMAS HAAMEK, INTRODUCTION TO HAAMEK
DAVAR.
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
Netziv’s discussion is premised on the biblical depiction of the Torah as a “poem” or
“song.” See Deuteronomy 31:19; MAIMONIDES, Laws of Tefillin u-Mezuzah ve-Sefer Torah
7:1, in MISHNEH TORAH; LEVI BEN GERSHON (RALBAG), Commentary on Deuteronomy 31:19;
Yissocher Frand, Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, TORAH.ORG (June 7, 2002),
https://torah.org/torah-portion/ravfrand-5760-haazinu/; Dov Freis, HaTorah Keshera, DA’AT,
http://www.daat.ac.il/mishpat-ivri/skirot/225-2.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2019); Michael
Hattin,
The
Commandment
to
Write
a
Torah
Scroll,
VBM,
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/commandment-write-torah-scroll (last visited Oct. 16, 2018);
Jay Kelman, Vayelech: Poetic License, TORAH IN MOTION (Aug. 11, 2014),
https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/vayelech-poetic-license;
Jonathan
Sacks, Nitzavim-Vayelech (5769)—The Torah as G-d’s Song, RABBI SACKS: COVENANT &
CONVERSATION (Sept. 12, 2009), http://rabbisacks.org/covenant-conversation-5769nitzavim-vayelech-the-torah-as-g-ds-song/; Jonathan Sacks, Torah as Song (Vayelech 5775),
RABBI SACKS: COVENANT & CONVERSATION (Sept. 16, 2015), http://rabbisacks.org/torah-assong-vayelech-5775/; Aviad Stollman, “Your Laws are Songs for Me” (Ps. 119:54), BARILAN U. PARASHAT HASHAVUA STUDY CTR., https://www.biu.ac.il/JH/Parasha/eng/haazinu/st
o.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); see also Mishnah, Yadayim 3:5; Avraham ben HaRambam,
Ma’amar al Odos Derashos Chazal, in MILCHAMOS HASHEM 91; Avraham Rivlin, The
Parable of Shir Hashirim, YESHIVAT KEREM B’YAVNEH, http://www.kby.org.il/english/toratyavneh/view.asp?id=3980 (last visited Oct. 6, 2018); Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Ubikashtem
Misham, in ISH HA-HALACHA–GALUY V’NISTAR 119–21 n.1 (1978) (analyzing layers of
meaning in biblical poetry); Moshe Taragin, Shir Ha-shirim—The Elegy of Jewish History,
VBM, https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shir-ha-shirim-elegy-jewish-history (last visited Oct. 16,
2018). Cf. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on “Eye
for Eye” and the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505, 539 (1998) (“[T]he Torah, the
Written Law, is poetry, and the Talmud, the Oral Law, is its prose counterpart . . . .”); Steven
Shaw, Orthodox Reactions to the Challenge of Biblical Criticism, 10 TRADITION 61, 75 (1969)
(“[W]hile the Bible may not be ‘just poetry[‘], it is at least poetry.”) (emphasis in original).
7
Notably, American legal scholars of differing interpretive views have observed the
poetic style of the United States Constitution, suggesting that the analogy of the Constitution
to poetry may appeal to a wide range of legal philosophies. See, e.g., Albert P. Blaustein,
Constitution Drafting: The Good, the Bad, and the Beautiful, 2 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING
49, 49 (1991) (“The language of a constitution must satisfy not only the requirements of
accuracy, brevity, and clarity, but also the test of beauty and inspiration. It is enough for most
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legal documents to contain good prose; a constitution must aspire to poetry.”); Garrett Epps,
Poetry of the Preamble, OUPBLOG (Sept. 17, 2013), https://blog.oup.com/2013/09/poetrypreamble-us-constitution-day/; Rob Natelson, From the Heartland: The Constitution’s Poetic
Preamble, AM. SPECTATOR (Feb. 13, 2018), https://spectator.org/the-constitutions-poeticpreamble/; see also Valery Giscard d’Estaing, The Calligraphy of History, in DESPERATELY
SEEKING EUROPE 259 (Susan Stern & Elisabeth Seligmann eds., 2003), cited in Elizabeth F.
Defeis, A Constitution for the European Union? A Transatlantic Perspective, 19 TEMP. INT’L
& COMP. L.J. 351, 382 n.252 (2005) (“The poetry of a constitution is in some ways the
calligraphy of history.”); William E. Forbath, Lincoln, the Declaration, and the “Grisly,
Undying Corpse of States’ Rights”: History, Memory, and Imagination in the Constitution of
a Southern Liberal, 92 GEO. L.J. 709, 718 (2004) (overserving that Charles Black’s “method
of interpreting the Constitution was very much like the method of reading poetry”); Charles
Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751,
758 (1987); Jeremy Webber, Constitutional Poetry: The Tension Between Symbolic and
Functional Aims in Constitutional Reform, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 260 (1999). Likewise,
scholars of differing political views have questioned the analogy between the Constitution
and poetry. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 142 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1997); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting
Law and Music: Performance Notes on “The Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of
Jews”, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1530 (1999) (“[W]e think that the analogy [of law] to the
performing arts is superior to the analogy to poetry or novels.”); Randy E. Barnett, Book
Review & Reply, Why You Should Read My Book Anyhow: A Reply to Trevor Morrison, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 873, 883 (2005) (contrasting interpretation of the Constitution and poetry);
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1129 (2003) (“One may, we suppose, apply a different
interpretive hermeneutic if reading the Constitution as literature, or poetry, or aspiration, or
as some kind of eighteenth-century political novel. But that is not, or at least should not be,
our enterprise as constitutional lawyers.”); Trevor W. Morrison, Book Review & Reply,
Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 839, 849 (2005) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004)). For other discussions of the relationship between law
and poetry, across a broad range of contexts, see, for example, SOLON OF ATHENS: NEW
HISTORICAL AND PHILOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Josine H. Blok & Andre P.M.H. Lardinois eds.,
2006); EMILY KATZ ANHALT, SOLON THE SINGER: POLITICS AND POETICS (1993); RYAN K.
BALOT, GREED AND INJUSTICE IN CLASSICAL ATHENS (2001); Bernhard Grossfeld, Poetry,
Language and Law, in RECHT UND SPRACHE 25 (Thomas Lundmark & Astrid Wallow eds.,
2006); Dennis Kurzon, Poetic Language and Court Opinions, in LAW AND AESTHETICS 240
(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1992); Sidney W. DeLong, The Poetry of Law, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 141
(2008); Edward J. Eberle & Bernhard Grossfeld, Law and Poetry, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 353 (2006); Bernhard Grossfeld & Josef Hoeltzenbein, Poetic Legal Dreams: CrossCultural Pioneers, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 47 (2007); John C. Kleefeld, From Brouhahas to
Brehon Laws: Poetic Impulse in the Law, 4 L. & HUMAN. 21 (2010); Anthony T. Kronman,
Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311 (1999); Alexandra J. Roberts, Book
Review, Constructing A Canon of Law-Related Poetry, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1507 (2012)
(reviewing POETRY OF THE LAW: FROM CHAUCER TO THE PRESENT (David Kader & Michael
Standford eds., 2010)); Richard K. Sherwin, Law and the Poetic Imagination, 61 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 347 (2016); David A. Skeel, Jr., Book Review, Practicing Poetry, Teaching Law, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1754 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE JOSEPH, BEFORE OUR EYES (1993));
Stephen J. Toope, Cultural Diversity and Human Rights, 42 MCGILLL L.J. 169 (1997); Adam
STD.
(Jan.
8,
2015),
J.
White,
Roberts’s
Frost,
WEEKLY
https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j-white/robertss-frost;
Law
and
Literature
Symposium, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 783 (2009).

LEVINE (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

2/24/2019 10:38 AM

THE CONSTITUTION AS POETRY

741

present an anomalous approach to understanding a legal text,8 but which are
standard and important methods of literary analysis when applied to poetry:
first, the expansive interpretation of a provision, a brief phrase or, at times,
a single word, to establish a wide-ranging set of principles and ideas; and
second, somewhat conversely, the interpretation of a provision, seemingly
stated in categorical terms, but understood to incorporate qualifications,
limitations, and exceptions. In either case, both the Jewish legal system and
the American legal system accept the authority, if not the competency, of
judicial experts to understand, interpret, and apply the text in ways that may
not be apparent, and that may be difficult to accept outside the technical
practices of biblical and constitutional exegeses. Finally, and perhaps as a
further justification for these methods of interpretation, this Article
concludes with the observation that, beyond their literary forms, the Torah
and the Constitution share poetry’s design to function as a timeless text,
susceptible to meaningful application and containing important lessons for
the foreseeable—and unforeseeable—future.
II. THE COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK
The analysis in this Article is premised on the following basic elements
of a comparative framework between the written Torah and the Constitution.
First, the Torah and the Constitution serve as the foundational documents
and supreme law within their respective legal systems, setting the parameters
for the subsequent development of the legal systems.9 Second, both the
Torah and the Constitution are relatively concise, and are written in stylized
literary forms, thus requiring extensive interpretation and application to
continue to function as the supreme law within working, living, and evolving
legal systems.10

8
See, e.g., Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 701 (2016):
[W]e show that constitutional law is in fact subject to special interpretive
methods as compared to other sources of law, such as statutes and
common-law precedents. . . . Textual interpretation likewise looks
markedly different in the constitutional setting. . . . [O]ur basic point
is . . . that the practice of interpreting constitutional language is distinct
from interpreting other sources of law.
Id. at 702–03.
9
See, e.g., 2 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 479 (A.
Philip and Muriel Berman ed., Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994) (referring
to the written Torah as the ”written ‘constitution’ of Jewish law”). See generally supra note
1.
10
See generally Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory,
supra note 1.
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Scholars have identified a number of literary forms and techniques
present in the Constitution’s text that lend themselves to methods of
interpretation that are arguably unique within American law.11 For example,
in a recent article, Samuel Bray has identified the use of hendiadys—”two
terms separated by a conjunction [that] work together as a single complex
expression”—within the Constitution.12 According to Bray, understanding
the function of hendiadys can, in turn, “help us understand the Necessary and
Proper Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”13
Elsewhere, Bray has explored the implications of the constitutional structure
for the interpretation of the text, noting a ”famous example” of inner-textual
interpretation in Chief Justice John Marshall’s interpretation of “necessary”
in the Necessary and Proper Clause “in light of its usage elsewhere in the
Constitution.”14
Similarly, as André LeDuc has observed, interpreting the First
Amendment’s protection of the freedom of the press, Justice Antonin Scalia
“has suggested that the courts have read the term press as a ‘sort of
synecdoche.’”15 For his part, LeDuc has argued that “[a] much more direct
approach [would be] to recognize the pragmatics of implicature[,]” which
would “capture[] the way context can be analyzed to highlight our rule-like
conventions or practices that enrich the semantic meanings of utterances and
texts.”16
11
See, e.g., Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 8. Cf. John F. Manning, The Eleventh
Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1693
(2004) (“[A]n important intellectual tradition suggests that the Court should approach
constitutional provisions with greater flexibility than it does with statutes.”); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1321, 1327–28 (2018) (“Through technical meanings and distinctive rules
of interpretation, the language of the law can affix a more precise meaning to constitutional
provisions than ordinary language can. . . . Several pieces of evidence strongly support the
conclusion that the Constitution is written in the language of the law.”).
12
Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in
the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 688 (2016).
13
Id. at 689. Bray suggests that:
There may be other instances of hendiadys in the U.S. Constitution, and
phrases worth considering including “Piracies and Felonies,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; “Powers and Duties,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
cl. 6; “Advice and Consent,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; “necessary
and expedient,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; “keep and bear,” U.S. CONST.
amend. II; and “searches and seizures,” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id. at 689 n.12.
14
Samuel Bray, Translating Genesis: Concluding Thoughts on Legal Interpretation and
Biblical
Translation,
REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Aug.
11,
2017),
https://reason.com/volokh/2017/08/11/translating-genesis-concluding (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
15
André LeDuc, Making the Premises About Constitutional Meaning Express: The New
Originalism and Its Critics, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 111, 170 (2016) (emphasis in original).
16
Id. at 170; see also Brian G. Slocum, Conversational Implicatures and Legal Texts,
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Likewise, for thousands of years, the interpretation of the Torah has
been premised upon the careful examination of the literary forms of the text.
The Talmud17 cites numerous hermeneutic principles that rely on exegesis of
both specific words and phrases, as well as broader structural properties of
the text of the Torah,18 ranging from the intertextual use of the same terms,19
to the proximity of words or phrases to one another,20 to the number of times
a rule is enumerated in the text.21 Indeed, under one prevailing account, the
text of the Torah is interpreted through thirteen distinct hermeneutic
devices,22 while on a broader level, much of the legal discussion and debate
in the Talmud centers around competing interpretations of the text.23
Of the various literary approaches to interpreting the Constitution and
the Torah, two are particularly evocative of the literary form and
interpretation of poetry: expansive interpretation of a word or phrase, and
interpretation of a seemingly categorical term to incorporate qualifications,
limitations, and exceptions.24
III. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION
Although differing interpretive approaches entail different—and often
diametrically opposed—attitudes toward both the means and ends of
constitutional interpretation, by nearly all accounts, fidelity to the
Constitution requires a method of interpretation and application that takes
the constitutional text seriously.25 In addition, even under narrow
29 RATIO JURIS 23 (2016).
17
The Talmud is the “written, authoritative compilation of the oral traditions and
interpretations” of the text of the Torah. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American
Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 445 n.17. See generally ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE
ESSENTIAL TALMUD (Chaya Galai trans., 1976).
18
See, e.g., Bernard Rosensweig, The Hermeneutic Principles and Their Application, 13
TRADITION 49 (1972); 1 ELON, supra note 9, at 281–399.
19
See Rosensweig, supra note 18, at 55–58.
20
See id. at 71–72.
21
See id. at 58–65.
22
See id. at 50.
23
See Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory, supra note 1,
at 444–68.
24
Notably, some scholars who observe, as a descriptive matter, the unique methods of
constitutional interpretation, still question the justifications for this approach. See Serkin &
Tebbe, supra note 8, at 703 (“Does this observed constitutional exceptionalism make sense?
In fact, and this is our second main argument, there are few compelling reasons to interpret
the Constitution differently from statutes, regulations, common law precedents, and other
sources of law.”). Conceptualizing the Constitution as poetry might provide a response to
their challenge.
25
But see, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (Geoffrey
R. Stone ed., 2012).
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interpretive methodologies, ascertaining the correct meaning of the
Constitution requires going beyond the literal contours of the textual
language.26 Indeed, one of the most striking elements of American
constitutional interpretation involves close and careful attention to the text
of the Constitution, including, at times, an expansive analysis, interpretation,
and application of the Constitution, to derive rules and rights that are
understood as self-evident within the scope of the larger constitutional
scheme.
As far back as the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized a presumption against superfluity,27
under which the Court has, at least in theory, accorded legal significance to
every textual provision in the Constitution.28 Taking this principle several
steps further, particularly in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, the Court
has employed an interpretive methodology that sometimes relies upon a
remarkably expansive reading of the constitutional text to derive broadly
articulated and understood—albeit often unenumerated—constitutional

26

Although the term “textualism” has been adopted by proponents of narrow methods
of interpretation, proponents of broader forms of interpretation may claim, conversely, that
their approach entails greater fidelity to the text, taking seriously both literal meaning and
textual implications. Indeed, the emergence of “living originalism” suggests that divergent
approaches to constitutional interpretation may present competing claims to a particular label.
See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). In any event, proponents of various
positions might accept or reject the notion of viewing the Constitution as poetry. See
generally supra note 7.
27
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed
that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”). Cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom for
the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 459, 475 (2012); Eugene Volokh, The Nonredundant Free Press Clause,
REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 26, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/04/26/thenonredundant-free-press-clause.
28
The Court’s approach to the interpretation of the Ninth Amendment arguably
undermines the practical application of this theory. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 236–37 (2004) (“[T]o this day courts
have rarely been willing to rely upon [the Ninth Amendment] when assessing the
constitutionality of statutes . . . .”); Kurt T. Lash, Three Myths of the Ninth Amendment, 56
DRAKE L. REV. 875, 875 (2008) (stating that courts are “reluctant to rely on the Ninth
Amendment at all” and that “the modern Supreme Court has studiously avoided the Ninth
Amendment despite being prodded by parties before the court to rely on it”); Mark C.
Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis
of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 89–90 (2000) (“[N]o Supreme Court
decision, and few federal appellate decisions, have relied on the Ninth Amendment for
support. Indeed, federal courts that have discussed the Ninth Amendment have almost
exclusively held that it does not confer any substantive rights.”). Alternatively, though,
perhaps the Ninth Amendment can be understood to have legal meaning, in the form of
secondary and symbolic functions. See Levine, Of Inkblots and Omnisignificance, supra note
1.
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rights.29
This method of expansive interpretation, though surely controversial
and subject to criticism,30 remains widespread, and may be understood
through a comparison to poetry, in which each word is carefully weighed
and measured, such that a single phrase—even a single word—is recognized
as representative of wide-ranging feelings or ideas, well beyond its literal or
limited meaning. Indeed, the literary form of poetry requires that the reader
engage in a close and careful analysis and interpretation of each word, as
necessary, to gain a full understanding of the broader meaning the poem
conveys. Likewise, a proper understanding of the United States Constitution
may be possible only through a close and careful analysis of each phrase and
word in the text.31
Thus, for example, in a number of landmark cases addressing some of
the most vital and dynamic areas of American law, the United States
Supreme Court has relied on an expansive interpretation of a single word in
the Fourteenth Amendment—”liberty”—as the textual basis for an entire
realm of rights jurisprudence.32 As Justice Harlan put it in Poe v. Ullman,
29
See, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Unenumerated Rights, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1
(2006). See generally Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated
Biblical Obligations, supra note 1.
30
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 472 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(characterizing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as relying on “tenuous
moorings to the text of the Constitution” and criticizing the majority in Eisenstadt for
“pass[ing] beyond the penumbras of the specific guarantees into the uncircumscribed area of
personal predilections”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The Court says
it is the right of privacy ‘created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.’ With all
deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part
of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court.”).
31
Cf. David Post, Ah, the Poetry of the Law!, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct.
21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/21/ahthe-poetry-of-the-law/?utm_term=.646ac256d869 (“I often used to tell the law students in my
classes that they should read more poetry, because nothing hones one’s skill at extracting
meaning from text better than reading poetry, and extracting meaning from texts is one of the
things lawyers have to do, all the time.”).
32
As far back as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court employed a method
of expansive interpretation to identify and articulate a broad range of unenumerated rights.
The Court emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
[w]ithout doubt . . . not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
Id. at 399. On this basis, the Court found that a teacher’s “right . . . to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children . . . are within the liberty of the
amendment.” Id. at 400. According to the Court, the Constitution recognizes “the calling of
modern language teachers, . . . the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and . . . the
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the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This “liberty”
is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking
of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right
to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .33
Likewise, the Court has interpreted constitutional provisions to
recognize the freedom of association and a right to privacy, both of which
have emerged as basic elements of the American legal system, but neither of
which is found in the text of the Constitution.34 As the Court further found
in Griswold v. Connecticut, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance.”35 For example, the Court explained, “while [association]
is not expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary
in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.”36 Similarly, according
to the Court, “[v]arious [constitutional] guarantees create zones of
privacy[,]”37 recognizing “the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms” as
“lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.”38 The interpretive method of identifying and
power of parents to control the education of their own.” Id. at 401; see also Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.) (noting that “[t]his Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” thus
including the right of a grandmother to live with her grandchildren) (quoting Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925) (recognizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control”).
33
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), cited in Moore, 431
U.S. at 502 (Powell, J.).
34
The recognition and broad application of an unenumerated “right to privacy” remains
an area of contention, prompting Justice Thomas’s recent comment that “[t]he word ‘privacy’
does not appear in the Fourth Amendment (or anywhere else in the Constitution for that
matter).” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
36
Id. at 483.
37
Id. at 484.
38
Id. at 485; see also id. at 484 (finding that the Third Amendment’s protection against
the quartering of soldiers in a house during peacetime without the owner’s consent represents
“another facet of that privacy”); id. (observing that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’
protections of criminal defendants’ rights recognized “the sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life”) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); id. at 485
(stating that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
created a “right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly
reserved to the people”) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)); id. at 484 (finding
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applying penumbras—which remains highly controversial39—might be
understood and justified as a literary technique necessary for interpreting and
understanding a poetic constitutional text.40
While the Supreme Court has thus applied a presumption against
superfluity to the text of the Constitution, resulting in careful and often
expansive interpretation of the provisions and words of the constitutional
text, Jewish legal tradition has gone further in finding meaning and
significance in the text of the Torah, according “omnisignificance” to each
and every word—even to the form of the letters that comprise the words.41
that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination “enables the citizen to create
a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment”). On a
similar note, one scholar has recently suggested that “few concepts dominate modern
constitutional jurisprudence more than dignity does without appearing in the Constitution,”
observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has invoked the term in connection with the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.”
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172–73 (2011).
39
See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2155,
2177 (2014) (“To characterize Justice Douglas’s ‘penumbras’ and ‘emanations’ reasoning as
unsuccessful would be an understatement. . . . Douglas’s reasoning has struck many
observers as so far beyond the pale of conventional constitutional reasoning as to defy
explanation.”); see also Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1485
(2008) (characterizing Griswold’s reference to penumbras as “one of the most ridiculed
sentences in the annals of the Supreme Court”); David Luban, The Warren Court and the
Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 28 (1999) (stating that “[t]his passage,
with its penumbras and emanations, is a strange one, and I can attest from personal experience
that it attracts a great deal of ridicule in law school faculty lounges[,]” but also “attempt[ing]
to explain this passage and then to defend it”).
40
Indeed, Pierre Schlag has offered the pejorative observation that “Justice Douglas’s
opinion for the Court reads more like an amateur exercise in metaphysical poetry than law.”
Pierre Schlag, Commentary, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1111
(2002).
41
See Yaakov Elman, “It Is No Empty Thing”: Nahmanides and the Search for
Omnisignificance, 4 TORAH U-MADDA J. 1, 1 (1993) (quoting JAMES KUGEL, THE IDEA OF
BIBLICAL POETRY: PARALLELISM AND ITS HISTORY 103–04 (1981))
[T]he basic assumption underlying all of “rabbinic exegesis” [is] that the
slightest details of the biblical text have a meaning that is both
comprehensible and significant. Nothing in the Bible ought to be
explained as the product of chance, or, for that matter, as an emphatic or
rhetorical form, or anything similar, nor ought its reasons to be assigned
to the realm of Divine unknowables. Every detail is put there to reach
something new and important, and it is capable of being discovered by
careful analysis.
Id.; see also TALMUD BAVLI, Menachoth 29b; ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH
THOUGHT 143 (1979) (“[E]ven the most seemingly trivial passages and variations in the Torah
can teach many lessons to the person who is willing to explore its depths.”); JOSEPH B.
SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 100 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983) (originally published in
Hebrew as Ish ha-halakhah, in 1 TALPIOT 3–4 (1944)) (“Our Torah does not contain even one
superfluous word or phrase. Each letter alludes to basic principles of Torah law, each word
to ‘well-fastened,’ authoritative, everlasting [laws]. From the beginning to end it is replete
with statutes and judgments, commandments and laws.”); ADIN STEINSALTZ, IN THE
BEGINNING: DISCOURSES ON CHASIDIC THOUGHT 45 (Yehudah Hanegbi trans., 1995) (“[T]he
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Fittingly, then, the Torah is expressly characterized as a poem,42 drawing a
direct parallel to a literary form in which each word must be examined and
pondered in an effort to fully ascertain the various meanings of the text.
Accordingly, for thousands of years, Jewish legal authorities have applied an
expansive method of interpretation to uncover and understand the lessons of
the Torah.
A helpful illustration of applying omnisignificance in the interpretation
of the text of the Torah may be found in the prohibition against having meat
and milk together.43 In three separate places, the text of the Torah prohibits
cooking a kid—a young goat—in its mother’s milk.44 Operating under the
presumption that each articulation of the prohibition must teach an
independent legal principle, the Talmud engages in expansive interpretation
of these verses, such that the prohibition includes not only cooking meat and
milk together, but also a second prohibition, against eating meat and milk
that are cooked together, and a third prohibition, against deriving benefit
from meat and milk that are cooked together.45
As another example, the Torah instructs not to engage in melacha on
the Sabbath.46 Although melacha is sometimes translated as “work,” a more
accurate legal definition of this term denotes a variety of ritually prohibited
activities.47 However, the written text of the Torah enumerates few examples
of activities that are prohibited on the Sabbath.48 Through textual exegesis,
the Talmud delineates thirty-nine principal categories of melacha, which are

Written Torah needs endless amplification, study, and clarification. There are infinite layers
of meaning, depthless beauty, and new modes of experientially living that which was
revealed.”); see, e.g., Yaakov Elman, The Rebirth of Omnisignificant Biblical Exegesis in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 2 JEWISH STUD. INTERNET J. 199, 199 (2003); Richard
C. Steiner, Meaninglessness, Meaningfulness, and Super-Meaningfulness in Scripture: An
Analysis of the Controversy Surrounding Dan 2:12 in the Middle Ages, 82 JEWISH Q. REV.
431, 431 (1992). See generally Levine, Of Inkblots and Omnisignificance, supra note 1. For
discussions of omsignificance in biblical narrative, see Levine, Halacha and Aggada, supra
note 1, at 485–92; see also SAMUEL J. LEVINE, WAS YOSEF ON THE SPECTRUM?
UNDERSTANDING JOSEPH THROUGH TORAH, MIDRASH, AND CLASSICAL JEWISH SOURCES
(2018).
42
See supra text accompanying note 6.
43
See Levine, Legislation in Jewish Law, supra note 1, at 922.
44
See Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21.
45
See TALMUD BAVLI, Chullin 115b.
46
See, e.g., Exodus 20:10; see also Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American
Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 445–46, 456; Levine, Legislation in Jewish Law, supra
note 1, at 922–23; Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 1, at
85–87.
47
See TALMUD BAVLI, Shabbath 73a; 2 ARYEH KAPLAN, Sabbath: Day of Eternity, in
THE ARYEH KAPLAN ANTHOLOGY 107, 128 (1991) (“[T]he prohibition is not against actual
labor as much as against ritual work.”).
48
See, e.g., Exodus 16:29; Exodus 35:3; Numbers 15:32–36.
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in turn divided into further sub-categories.49 In fact, the Talmud dedicates
an entire tractate—one of sixty-three sections of the Talmud—to a complex
analysis of the laws of the Sabbath.50 Just as the United States Supreme
Court has developed an entire area of constitutional rights jurisprudence
based on the interpretation and application of a single word in the
constitutional text—”liberty”—the Talmud established a central area of
jurisprudence based almost entirely on the biblical word melacha.51
IV. CATEGORICAL TERMS SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION, LIMITATION, AND
EXCEPTION
Another area of shared interpretive methodology between the Torah
and the Constitution further illustrates the necessity to interpret and apply
both of these foundational texts in ways that would otherwise defy ordinary
methods of textual—even legal—interpretation. Both the Torah and the
Constitution include provisions that, although stated in seemingly
categorical terms, are subject to various qualifications, limitations and
exceptions.52 Here too, the interpretation of poetry may provide a helpful
parallel to the notion that a text, albeit absolute on its face, should be
understood as using a literary form that requires interpretation, refinement,
and modification.
For example, the First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”53 Of course, however,
American law prohibits murder, and no interpretation of the constitutional
text would accept, as a defense, the claim that a religion requires its adherents
to commit murder. In fact, under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
Free Exercise Clause does not provide an exception to any neutral law of
general applicability.54
49
See KAPLAN, supra note 47, at 133–44; TALMUD BAVLI, supra note 47, at 73a; see also
BARUCH CHAIT, THE 39 AVOTH MELACHA OF SHABBATH (1992).
50
See generally TALMUD BAVLI, supra note 47.
51
See generally Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated
Biblical Obligations, supra note 1.
52
See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, Textualism on Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial Provision,
the “Petty Offense” Exception, and Other Departures from Clear Constitutional Text, 51
HOUS. L. REV. 89 (2013). Cf. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV.
1499 (2009).
53
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see
also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights
in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2010)
[F]ree exercise of religion is in our national pantheon of rights. The
Constitution references it in much the same absolute manner as it does
freedom of speech. Yet, it too is highly qualified in practice. Few, when
pressed, would deny that some limit on this right is necessary. Were the
freedom to practice religion absolute, every person would be “a law unto
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Likewise, the First Amendment instructs, “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”55 Notwithstanding Justice Black’s
declaration that “no law means no law,”56 the United States Supreme Court
has long recognized the need to interpret the First Amendment in less than
categorical terms,57 permitting, for example: governmental restrictions on
himself,” and government would, for instance, be powerless to stop
someone from conducting a human sacrifice for religious reasons. . . .
Under the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the First
Amendment, the right to practice religion is highly qualified in
practice. . . . [I]t does not exempt religious individuals from generally
applicable laws that have a rational basis. . . . [F]ree exercise, like all
rights, is highly qualified, whether it is protected by the Constitution or
by statute.
Id. at 293–95.
55
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (“I read ‘no law . . . abridging’ to mean no
law abridging.”) (omission in original); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365–66
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain
snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the
words, can neither be searched nor seized. . . . Rather than using language in a completely
artificial way, I must conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to
eavesdropping.”).
57
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”); see also
Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy
Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010); Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of
Constitutional Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1087, 1100 (1993) (“[T]he apparently unequivocal
command that Congress and, because of the Fourteenth Amendment, state legislatures pass
‘no law’ abridging freedom of speech has been (sensibly) interpreted to mean that speech can
indeed be abridged if the state presents a ‘compelling interest’ justifying the abridgement.”);
Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 59 (1989) (“Justice Black says that
‘no law’ means ’no law,’ but no one seriously maintains that the Constitution invalidates a
law forbidding incitement to mutiny on a naval vessel or falsely shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded
theater.”); Wilkinson, supra note 54:
While frequently discussed in absolute terms, freedom of speech is more
limited in practice. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly “rejected an
absolutist interpretation” of the right on more than one occasion. Rather
than treating freedom of speech as an “unlimited license” to express
oneself, the Court has narrowed the scope of the right by taking
competing social interests into account. . . . [T]he First Amendment
“does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and
places or in any manner that may be desired.” That is, freedom of speech
is a far more limited right than our rhetoric suggests.
Id. at 292–93 (citations omitted); Eugene Volokh, Which Part of “Make No Law” Don’t I
Understand?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 26, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/07/26/whichpart-of-make-no-law-dont-i-understand/
[I]f one is to conclude that the government . . . is so categorically
restrained by the First Amendment, I think it would take some very
powerful and clear historical and textual evidence that the First
Amendment has indeed been understood this absolutely. . . . [T]he

LEVINE (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

2/24/2019 10:38 AM

THE CONSTITUTION AS POETRY

751

defamation, child pornography, obscenity, fighting words, and “true
threats”; regulations on speech through time, place, or manner limitations;
and a broader degree of restrictions on commercial speech.58 Thus, like
poetry, the powerful wording of the First Amendment text may be read, at
once, to carry rhetorical and expressive value, but also to require a more
subtle method of interpretation for its meaning to be fully and accurately
understood.59
Similarly, the text of the Torah commands not to engage in any melacha
on the Sabbath, but there are considerable qualifications here, as well.
Notwithstanding the legal and philosophical significance and centrality of
the Sabbath in Jewish thought,60 in the face of life-threatening danger, any
and all activities otherwise prohibited on the Sabbath should be performed,
without hesitation or delay.61 Indeed, more generally, virtually any plausible
possibility of danger to life overrides nearly every competing obligation
in Jewish law, not only permitting, but mandating, violation of the dictates
of the competing obligation.62 Thus, the facially categorical textual
history cuts against any such absolutist position, and the text—especially
given the history—does not actually support that position.
Id.

58

See, e.g., Gertrude N. Levine & Samuel J. Levine, Internet Ethics, American Law, and
Jewish Law: A Comparative Overview, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 37, 43 (2016) (citing sources).
59
Cf. Andrew Tutt, The Revisability Principle, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1113 (2015)
First Amendment cases tend to invite a special sort of bombast and
embroidery, a romanticism inconsistent with what the cases
actually do when the chips fall. One need only recall Justice Robert H.
Jackson’s line from West Virginia v. Barnette that “no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion,” or Justice Harlan’s comment
in Cohen v. California that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” or
Justice Hugo Black’s assertion that “no law means no law” (even when
Justice Black joined Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cohen)—to see that
not everything that is said in a First Amendment case can be taken to
mean what it says.
Id. at 1151.
60
See, e.g., TALMUD BAVLI, Chulin 5a, Commentary of Rashi; MAIMONIDES, Laws of
Sabbath 30:15, in MISHNEH TORAH; RAMBAN (NACHMANIDES), COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH
312–13 (Charles B. Chavel trans., 1973); KAPLAN, supra note 47.
61
See MAIMONIDES, Laws of Sabbath 2:2–2:3, in MISHNEH TORAH.
62
See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, The Yale L. Rosenberg Memorial Lecture: Taking
Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to
“Seek Justice” in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1359, 1359
n.67 (2004) (citing TALMUD BAVLI, Yoma 85a-b; MAIMONIDES, Laws of Sabbath 2, in
MISHNEH TORAH; 2 ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 38–49 (Abraham
Sutton ed., 1992); HERSHEL SCHACHTER, B’IKVEI HATZOAN 14–18 (1997); JOSEPH B.
SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 34–35 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983)); see also YITZCHAK
ZEEV HA-LEVI SOLOVEITCHIK, CHIDUSHEI MARAN RI’Z HA-LEVI 12–13 (1998); Samuel J.
Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37
IND. L. REV. 21, 57 n.151 (2003) (“[N]early every obligation in Jewish law is suspended to
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prohibition on melacha on the Sabbath—as well as numerous other
prohibitions stated in categorical terms—are subject to qualifications,
limitations, and exceptions, once again evoking a poetic form that expresses
feelings and ideas in absolute terms, but which is understood to have a more
nuanced meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
In addition to their poetic literary forms, the Torah and the Constitution
share another property of poetry: both were designed to function as a timeless
text, with meaningful application for the foreseeable—and unforeseeable—
future. As Chief Justice John Marshall famously declared:
[A] constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can
approach it. Its course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to
storms and tempests, and its framers must be unwise statesmen
indeed, if they have not provided it, as far as its nature will permit,
with the means of self-preservation from the perils it may be
destined to encounter.63
The timeless design of the Torah is even more apparent through its
Divine origins, its repeated declaration of its own eternity,64 and the
historical record of its abiding survival and success, for thousands of years,
amidst storms, tempests, and perils far beyond those contemplated by John
Marshall.
Like timeless poetry, the Constitution and the Torah may—and, to
continue to function at supreme law, must—be interpreted and applied in the
face of ever-changing circumstances and unanticipated scenarios. Indeed,
how do we apply the fixed text of the Constitution, a document that is more
than 200 years old, to cases involving electricity, credit cards, the Internet,
cell phones—scenarios that not only did not exist at the time the Constitution
was ratified, but could not have been envisioned by the framers of the
Constitution? The questions are complex, and the answers may at times
seem elusive. In addressing these issues, American legal authorities look to
the text, the principles, and the precedents of constitutional interpretation,
applying the settled law to new and unanticipated cases. Over the years, for
example, Fourth Amendment provisions requiring a warrant to authorize the
government to conduct a search65 have been interpreted and applied to cases

save a life.”).
63
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821).
64
See, e.g., Exodus 31:12–17.
65
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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involving phone booths66 and, more recently, cases involving cell phones;67
in cases of thermal imaging devices that can detect activity inside a home;68
and in cases of Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices placed on
vehicles.69
This phenomenon has been even more pronounced in the context of the
written Torah, which has been interpreted and applied over the course of
thousands of years, through scenarios unimagined by—and often
unimaginable to—those who received the Torah, involving new and
unanticipated geographical, societal, and technological conditions. As just
one of countless examples, returning once more to the prohibition against
engaging in melacha—various forms of activity—on the Sabbath, does the
prohibition apply to the use of electricity on the Sabbath?70 Applying the
settled law—the thirty-nine categories of melacha—to new and emerging
scenarios, some legal authorities prohibit the active use of electricity, on the
grounds that causing the flow of an electric current is sufficiently similar to
lighting a fire.71 Others hold that completing an electrical circuit falls under
the category of “building” a vessel or of “completing” a vessel so that it can
serve its function.72 Turning on an electric light is considered by many to
constitute burning a fire on the Sabbath, through the act of burning the
filament.73 Alternatively, based on the Talmudic principle extending the
melacha of cooking, to include non-food objects, turning on an electric light
may thus involve “cooking” the filament.74
And of course, as technology continues to advance almost daily, further
questions continue to arise.75 What is the status of a smartphone in Jewish
Law? What will be the impact of virtual reality? Will self-driving cars be
permitted for use on the Sabbath? As these questions continue, just as United
States courts have applied the Constitution to new and emerging
technologies, Jewish legal authorities will continue to interpret and apply
ancient texts, laws, and principles to cutting-edge changes in the way we live
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our daily lives. As such, the Constitution and the Torah take on the qualities
of a most profound form of poetry, a text that must be carefully read, studied,
and understood, to serve as an ongoing source of supreme law for the legal
systems they represent.

